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isiana workmen, including plaintiff. The majority distinguished
cases of lesser causal relation, 27 and observed that Louisiana
jurisdiction had been sustained on less direct relationship be-
tween the activity and the cause of action than was evident in
the instant case.28
The opposing judicial views are attributable to the differ-
ence of qualitative standards for the determination of sufficient
minimum contacts. If Judge Hood's yardstick is proper, the
instant case is an extreme application of the minimum contacts
rule, perhaps the extreme limit beyond which jurisdiction can-
not be maintained. Yet if Judge Tate's qualitative standards are
valid, the instant case was only a routine application of the
McGee standard. The fact that the Supreme Court which had
decided McGee and had decided Denckla dismissed the appeal
in the instant case for "want of a substantial federal question ' 2
and that Justice Harlan went so far as to urge that the appeal
be dismissed for "want of jurisdiction' 3 0 supports the conclu-
sion that the outer limits of the 1960 procedural statute have
yet to be defined.3 1
Billy J. Tauzin
WRONGFUL DEATH - HUSBAND'S RIGHT TO RECOVER THE Loss
OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS RESULTING FROM THE
DEATH OF His WIFE
The plaintiff sued on behalf of himself and his minor son in
federal district court under diversity of citizenship for the loss
27. See cases cited 170 So. 2d at 518, 527.
28. See Covington v. Southern Specialty Sales Co., 158 So. 2d 79 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963), where the defendant nonresident manufacturer had purposely en-
tered Louisiana in connection with the sales of mowing machines, one of which
injured plaintiff. The defendant had a representative come to Louisiana every
four or five weeks to supply technical aid, information, and assistance in ordering
defendant's products. This activity was not directly connected with the sale to the
retailer of the specific machine which injured plaintiff after the retailer sold it.
Yet Louisiana was held to have jurisdiction where the cause of action was merely
indirectly connected with the minimal ,business activity.
29. 382 U.S. 16 (1965).
30. Ibid.
31. See LA. R.S. 13:3201-3207 (Supp. 1964). This statute, commonly called
the "Louisiana long-arm statute," enumerates in some detail the types of activity
sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, and applies
to all nonresidents rather than to corporations alone as does LA. R.S. 13:3471(1)
(1950). Since the instant case involved a suit for workmen's compensation, which
is classified as an action exr contractu, it seems the case could have been disposed
of under the contractual provision of the "long-arm statute," LA. R.S. 13:3201(a)
(Supp. 1964).
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of pecuniary benefits resulting from the death of his wife caused
by the negligence of the defendant's insured. The court, apply-
ing Louisiana law, held, that unless the plaintiff "is completely
unable to support himself or his son and they both were totally
reliant' upon the income of the deceased for support, the claim
will be denied. Kruithof v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 241 F.
Supp. 351 (W.D. La. 1965).
At common law 2 as well as in early Louisiana jurisprudence,8
the death of a human being did not give rise to a cause of action.
Prompted by the celebrated Lord Campbell's Act,4 every Ameri-
can state now provides a statutory remedy for wrongful death.5
The purpose of these statutes is to repair the loss suffered by
members of the family when another member is killed. Most
states limit recovery to "pecuniary" losses," but these can em-
1. Kruithof v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 241 F. Supp. 351, 354 (W.D.
La. 1965).
2. In 1808 Lord Ellenborough held that a husband had no cause of action
for the loss of his wife's services caused by her death, and ruled that "in a civil
court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury."
Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808).
3. McCubbin v. Hastings, 27 La. Ann. 713 (1875) ; Frank v. New Orleans &
Carrollton R.R., 20 La. Ann. 25 (1868) ; Earhart v. New Orleans & Carrollton
R.R., 17 La. Ann. 243 (1865) ; Hubgh v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 6 La.
Ann. 495 (1851).
4. Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 VICT. c. 93 (1846).
5. 1 Prosser, Torts § 121 (3d ed. 1964). These statutes generally provide
for a "survival" action - that cause of action the deceased would have had if death
had not ensued; a "wrongful death" action - that cause of action for the loss
sustained 'by certain designated beneficiaries; or both. LA. CIVIL CODE art.
2315 (1870) provides for both causes of action:
"Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it.
"The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi
offense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his
legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the sur-
viving spouse.
"The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense,
if the injured person die, shall survi.e for a period of one year from the death
of the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of
the deceased, or either such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving
father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or
child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or
any of them, if he left no spouse. child, or parent surviving. The survivors in
whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the damages which
they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. A right to recover
damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which, on the
death of the survivor in whose favor the right of action survived, is inherited
by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit has been instituted thereon
by the survivor or not.
"As used in this article, the words 'child', 'brother', 'sister', 'father', and
'mother' include a child, brother, sister, father, and mother, by adoption, respec-
tively."
6. 1 PROSSER, TORTS § 121 (2d ed. 1964).
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brace a wide variety of tangible benefits, i.e., the value of the
support, services, and contributions the family could reasonably
have expected if death had not intervened.7 Thus, in the case of
death of a wife, the loss not only of her contributions to the
family but also of the value of her services in the household is
recoverable in most jurisdictions." The beneficiaries' expecta-
tion of financial contributions from the wife is the measure of
recovery, and not her "earnings" as such, the former being per-
haps, but not necessarily, congruent with her income.9
Louisiana does not limit recovery to "pecuniary" losses, but
rather compensates for all losses, including loss of love, affec-
tion, and companionship. 10 In the case of death of a husband,"
7. Ibid.
8. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Tucker, 211 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1954); In re
Wood's Petition, 145 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1956); Rosenblatt v. United
States, 112 F. Supp. 114 (E.D.N.C. 1953); St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. v.
Beasley, 205 Ark. 688, 170 S.V.2d 667 (1943) ; Torres v. Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 2d
35, 22 Cal. Rptr. 866, 372 P.2d 906 (1962); Burke v. San Francisco, 111 Cal.
App. 2d 314, 244 P.2d 708 (1952); Martin v. Manfeldt, 100 Cal. App. 2d 327,
223 P.2d 501 (1950); Potter v. Empress Theatre Co., 91 Cal. App. 2d 4, 204
P.2d 120 (1949) ; Hornstein v. Marks, 21 Conn. Sup. 233, 153 A.2d 923 (1958) ;
Grimes v. King, 311 Mich. 399, 18 N.V.2d 870 (1945) ; Thoirs v. Pounsford,
210 Minn. 462, 299 N.W. 16 (1941) ; Bulkley v. Thompson, 240 Mo. App. 588,
211 S.W.2d 83 (1948) ; Waterman v. State, 24 Misc. 2d 783, 206 N.Y.S.2d 380
(1960); Granni v. State, 206 Misc. 984, 136 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1954); L amm v.
L.orbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952) ; Pauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1,
244 P.2d 598 (1952); Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express,
386 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959) ; Slidelkum v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa.
408, 45 A.2d 59 (1946) ; Continental Bus System v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
9. Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964) ; MeStay v.
Przychocki, 9 N.J. Super. 365, 74 A.2d 370 (1950) ; Herro v. Northwestern
Malleable Iron Co., 181 Wis. 198, 194 N.W. 383 (1923).
10. Silverman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Fidelity &
Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Talbot, 234 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1956); Thompson v. New
Orleans By. & Light Co., 148 La. 698, 87 So. 716 (1921); Dougherty v. New
Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 133 La. 993, 63 So. 493 (1913) ; Roby v. Kansas City
So. By., 130 La. 896, 58 So. 701 (1912) ; Robertson v. Town of Jennings, 128
La. 795, 55 So. 375 (1911) ; Wooten v. United Irrigation & Rice Milling Co.,
128 La. 294, 54 So. 824 (1911) ; Bourg v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 120 La.
1009, 45 So. 972 (1908) ; Dobyns v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 119 La. 72, 43 So. 934
(1907); Parker v. Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co., 115 La. 463, 39 So. 445
(1.905) ; Hampton v. Security Storage & Van Co., 148 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962) ; Freeman v. United States Cas. Co., 88 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1956) ; Barnes v. Red River & G.R.Rt., 128 So. 724 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930).
11. Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers, 166 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1948) Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. O'Neill, 100 C.C.A. 658, 177 Fed. 328 (5th Cir. 1910) Dougherty v. New
Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 133 La. )3, 63 So. 493 (1.913) ; Lloyd v. T. L. James &
Co., 178 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) ; Averette v. Travelers Ins. Co., 174
So. 2d 881 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) Landry v. American Sur. Co. of N.Y., 149
So. 2d 738 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963); Hampton v. Security Storage & Van Co.,
1.48 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Jones v. Lee, 144 So. 2d 405 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962) ; Navarrett v. Joseph Laughlin, Inc., 20 So. 2d 313 (La. App. Or].
Cir. 1945), rerersed on other grounds, 209 La. 417, 24 So. 2d 672 (1945).
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a child, 12 or even a brother' 3 the Louisiana courts consistently
award to other members of the family the amount of the finan-
cial contributions they could reasonably have expected from
the deceased if death had not occurred. In order to recover it is
not necessary to show dependency upon the deceased,' 4 nor is it
necessary to show a legal obligation of the deceased to support
the beneficiary. 15  In Pennington v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co. 16 a
wife was permitted to recover her financial loss resdlting from
the death of her husband, although according to a premarital
contract she had no legal right to either his earnings or his
acquisitions. The court stated:
"We are not here concerned with the legally enforceable
obligations which flow from statutory provisions, but with
the actual pecuniary and material loss which has been sus-
tained as a natural consequence of a tortious act."'1 7
The Louisiana jurisprudence reveals four relevant cases
applying the wrongful death statute to the death of a wife or
mother. In Viosca v. Touro Infirmary,' the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered as an element of damages the husband's reliance upon
the deceased wife as a chauffeur because he was disabled from
driving and allowed recovery for the loss of these services. The
First Circuit in Toney v. Pope19 considered that the deceased
wife "helped her husband with his dairy farm and school bus
route' 20 in granting recovery to the husband. Also, in Gunter
12. Caldwell v. United States Cas. Co. of N.Y., 129 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961); Freeman v. Audubon Ins. Co., 120 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960) ; Watson v. McEacharn, 99 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) ; Kaough
v. Hadley, 165 So. 748 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
13. Freeman v. United States Cas. Co., 88 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1956).
14. Evans v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. La. 1951); Caldwell v.
United States Cas. Co. of N.Y., 129 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Freeman
v. Audubon Ins. Co., 120 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Watson v. Mc-
Eacharn, 99 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957); Kaough v. Hadley, 165 So.
748 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
15. Evans v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. La. 1951); Caldwell v.
United States Cas. Co. of N.Y., 129 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Penning-
ton v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 123 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Freeman v.
Audubon Ins. Co., 120 So. 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960); Watson v. Mc-
Eacharn, 99 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957); Freeman v. United States
Cas. Co., 88 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); Kaough v. Hadley, 165 So.
748 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
16. 123 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
17. Id. at 634.
18. 170 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
19. 110 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
20. Id. at 228.
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v. State21 the same court recognized that "at the time of her
death Mrs. Gunter was in training to become a practical nurse
and was also selling Avon toilet products." 22 The implication
seems to be that the husband had lost contributions he could
reasonably have expected from the earnings of his wife as a
sales person and from her prospective earnings as a practical
nurse. Finally, in Evans v. United States2 a husband, suing for
the loss suffered by his children as a result of the death of their
mother, recovered the $25 per month that she had been con-
tributing to their support. Thus, the general rule appears to be
that the portion of the wife's earnings which her family could
reasonably expect to receive should be included in the measure
of recovery.
In the instant case, Mr. Kruithof was suing not only for his
individual loss of pecuniary benefits resulting from the death
of his wife, but also for the loss suffered by his minor son. The
court in denying recovery, based its decision on the Second Cir-
cuit case, Parker v. Smith,24 where a husband was denied recov-
ery for the value of the services rendered by his deceased wife
in his office, the value of which he had measured by the cost of
hiring someone to replace her. The court in that case reasoned:
"During the lifetime of Mrs. Parker, she was not working
for the plaintiff, but rather both the plaintiff and his de-
ceased wife were working for the community of acquets and
gains which existed between them and which was terminated
at the time of her demise. Any claim that exists for the loss
of services of Mrs. Parker is a claim to be asserted by the
community of acquets and gains, not by the husband, the
head and master, in his individual capacity. Therefore, since
this would be a claim to be asserted by the community, it be-
came extinct at the time of the termination of the commu-
nity."2
In the instant case the court stated that it would follow Parker
and deny recovery unless it could be shown that Mr. Kruithof
was "completely unable to support himself or his son and that
they both were totally reliant upon Mrs. Kruithof's income for
support. '26
21. 127 So. 2d 31 (La. App. I st Cir. 1961).
22. Id. at 39.
23. 100 F. Supp. 5 (V.D. La. 1951).
24. 147 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
25. Id. at 411.
26. Kruithof v. Hartford Acc. & Indern. Co., 241 F. Supp. 351, 354 (W.D. La.
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The result reached in Parker v. Smith can be reconciled with
article 2315 and the cases discussed above. In Parker the wife
was working in the husband's business and he was seeking re-
covery predicated upon the loss to the business - the cost of re-
placing her. Thus, in effect he was asking the court to protect
his business against the loss of an employee, who in that case
happened to be his wife. The court was justified in rejecting
this demand because article 2315 does not protect the employer-
employee relationship, but rather protects the family relation-
ship. Therefore, Parker v. Smith is not an adequate basis for
denying the husband's recovery of his pecuniary loss resulting
from the death of his wife.
The court's denial of recovery on the basis that the income
of the wife belonged to the community of acquets and gains
which ceased to exist on her death is analytically unsound be-
cause it fails to recognize that the loss caused by death of a mem-
ber of the family is suffered by the other members of the family
and is not suffered by a legal fiction, the marital community.
The husband and the child have lost the contributions which
the wife was making to the maintenance of the household. In
addition, the application of the community property concept to
this case fails to distinguish the earnings of the wife from those
of the husband. Both are community property,27 but the Louisi-
ana courts consistently allow recovery by the wife for the loss of
the financial contributions of her husband,2 8 whereas this case
would deny recovery to the husband for the loss of the financial
contributions of his wife. Finally, the court concedes that the
husband could recover if he is totally dependent upon his wife.
Such a holding is not consistent with the community property
concept because her earnings would still belong to the community
of acquets and gains which, according to the reasoning of the
court, had ceased to exist.
Moreover, the holding in the instant case denying recovery
to the father and minor son for the loss of support of the mother
disregards the prior Louisiana jurisprudence2 9 and is contrary
to the true theory of wrongful death, that the members of the
1965). It is interesting to note that the court, in distinguishing the instant case
from the cases where the wife is merely injured and the husband is entitled to
recover, stated that in the latter cases the community was still in existence
inasmuch as the wife was only injured and not killed.
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
28. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
29. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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family are entitled to recover the loss of the financial contribu-
tions which they could reasonably have expected to receive from
the deceased if death had not .ensued.
When a Louisiana court is faced with the question of whether
to allow a husband recovery for the loss of the financial contri-
butions of his wife upon her wrongful death, it is hoped that
the instant case will be rejected. It is in conflict with the exist-
ing Louisiana jurisprudence, is contrary to the position of other
jurisdictions including those with community property systems,3 0
is inconsistent with the basic policy of article 2315, and it dis-
torts the community property concept and puts Louisiana in the
intolerable situation of granting recovery for injuries to a spouse
but not for the spouse's death, making it less costly for the de-
fendant to kill her than merely to injure her. 31
A. J. Gray III
30. No cases have been found in which the husband's claim for the loss of
the value of the wife's financial contributions has been denied on the theory that
the community had ceased to exist at her death.
31. Most lawyers are familiar with the legend, quite unfounded, that this was
the original reason that passengers in Pullman car berths rode with their heads
to the front. Also that the fire axes in railroad coaches were provided to enable
the conductor to deal efficiently with those who were merely injured. 1 PRossER,
Torts § 121 n.42 (3d ed. 1964).
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